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Abstract: This article compares the use of people outside government to consider electoral 
reform in three countries using the single-member plurality electoral system. The composition 
of electoral reform bodies, ranging from commissions of experts (New Zealand) and ex-
politicians (Britain) to assemblies of randomly selected citizens (British Columbia), appears 
to have influenced how well their recommendations were received by the public. 
Governments should be careful not to assume that they can retain control of the electoral 
reform process once they let it out of their hands, as the cases of New Zealand and British 
Columbia show, where majorities of the voters chose reform. 
 2 
Since the 1970s, calls for electoral reform have gained momentum in Commonwealth 
countries using the single-member plurality (SMP) electoral system, colloquially known as 
‘first-past-the-post’. In a few instances, governments have responded by appointing panels of 
outsiders, made up of experts, politicians, or even average citizens, to investigate whether the 
electoral system should be changed, and if so, in what way. New Zealand abolished its SMP 
electoral system after almost 54 per cent of the voters in a 1993 referendum chose the mixed-
member proportional (MMP) system, based upon the German form of proportional 
representation (PR) recommended by a government-appointed commission composed mainly 
of non-partisan experts. 
In another case, however, a government managed to renege on a promise to hold a 
referendum on changing the electoral system. The British Labour Party promised in its 1997 
election manifesto to allow voters a choice on an alternative to SMP, but the Labour 
government never held that referendum, despite the fact that the mixed-member electoral 
system, ‘alternative vote top-up’, recommended by the commission (composed mainly of ex-
politicians) it appointed was arguably the option preferred by, or the least objectionable to, the 
government. In the final case, a Canadian provincial government took the most radical step of 
the three by appointing randomly chosen citizens to an assembly that would recommend an 
alternative to SMP. The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly recommended the single 
transferable vote (STV) electoral system, the Irish form of PR, but the government required a 
supermajority of 60 per cent of voter support in a referendum for passage, meaning that the 
57.7 per cent that was actually obtained in the May 2005 referendum was insufficient. 
This article will examine the cases of New Zealand, Britain and British Columbia, 
where electoral system changes were considered by outsiders and recommended to 
governments, from the 1980s to the present. The cases are similar in that all are 
Commonwealth countries with a Westminster political tradition and institutions, including 
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SMP elections (up to 1993 in the New Zealand case). Furthermore, in all three cases, a major 
political party suffered the ‘injustices’ of SMP – in New Zealand Labour lost two successive 
elections despite winning more votes than its opponent; in Britain Labour was in the political 
wilderness for 18 successive years and began to question whether it would ever return to 
power under SMP; and in British Columbia the Liberals had lost an election despite winning 
more votes than their opponent, as in the New Zealand case. Ultimately, in all three places, 
people from outside the government were appointed to review the SMP electoral system. 
These unusual circumstances make the three cases worthy of a critical comparison. 
This article argues that the composition of the outside review bodies determined how 
radical the recommendation of an alternative to SMP would be, with the more independent 
bodies selecting electoral system alternatives less likely to find favour with governments (or 
the political establishment in general). There were major differences in the independence, and 
even in the very culture of each body, from the randomly appointed citizens in British 
Columbia, to the prestigious academic experts in New Zealand, to the partisan ex-politicians 
in Britain. The more independent the body, the more seriously its recommendation for 
electoral reform might be taken by the public, while reform proposals from those who were 
closer to the political establishment could, perhaps, be more easily dismissed. Governments 
attempted to protect themselves by using some form of sabotage of the reform effort along the 
way, although the New Zealand government ultimately failed in its attempt to prevent 
wholesale electoral system change, from SMP to the proportional MMP. In British Columbia 
the prospect of a switch to STV still looms over the government, which ultimately agreed to 
hold another referendum in 2009 once new constituency boundaries – one set for SMP and 
one for STV – are drawn up. 
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HOW ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ARE CHANGED 
The electoral system is arguably the most important rule of the political game, and the likely 
consequences of electoral systems have been well known by politicians and political scientists 
for some time. Josep Colomer recently summed up the preferences of politicians in this 
concise way: ‘the large prefer the small, and the small prefer the large’, meaning that parties 
with large electoral support prefer single-member constituency systems and small legislatures, 
both of which favour large parties, while small parties prefer large electoral districts (typical 
of proportional electoral systems) and large legislatures.
1
 Colomer also observed that there is 
a trend towards PR worldwide, and once PR is chosen, it is very rare (almost unheard of) for a 
country to revert to a majoritarian electoral system. Shifts to PR are likely to occur, according 
to Colomer, when there is electoral support for a greater number of parties, even if that 
support does not immediately translate into a significant number of seats for those parties.
2
 
Greater electoral diversity has appeared since the 1970s in some Commonwealth 
countries that use SMP, including Britain. There, the share of the vote won by the two largest 
parties, Labour and the Conservatives, went from about 90 per cent in the 1950s to about 70 
per cent in the 1970s, where it remains. This shift has led to calls for electoral system change 
from academics and outside observers, as well as from the politicians most disadvantaged by 
SMP. The Hansard Society Commission on Electoral Reform recommended a PR system 
based on the (then West) German model (MMP) in 1976. Later, the Labour Party itself 
reviewed electoral systems under the guidance of Raymond (Lord) Plant, himself a supporter 
of MMP. His 1993 final report, however, recommended the supplementary vote (SV), similar 
to the alternative vote (AV), a highly majoritarian electoral system used in Australia to elect 
its House of Representatives. Labour was, of course, in no position to influence the House of 
Commons electoral system in the 1980s and most of the 1990s, as the Conservatives managed 
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constantly to win under SMP while its opposition, Labour and what are now called the Liberal 
Democrats, remained divided. 
Elsewhere in the English-speaking world, more political parties were trying to enter 
the system and break the two-party stranglehold often seen where legislatures are elected by 
SMP. New Zealand saw the rise of small parties that took votes away from the ‘duopoly’ of 
the Labour and National Parties. In the 1978 and 1981 elections, Labour lost to National, 
despite having won more votes each time. In Canada, where third parties had existed for 
decades within a federal parliament elected by SMP, provincial elections were also showing 
signs of becoming more than two-party contests by the 1990s. In British Columbia, four 
parties won seats in the 1996 provincial election, but the leading party on vote share, the 
Liberals, lost to the New Democratic Party, which won a majority of seats.  
These perverse election results, as well as Labour’s exclusion from power for 18 
consecutive years in Britain, prompted renewed questioning of the SMP electoral system by 
those large parties that normally would expect to benefit from it. The resulting promises – 
usually made when parties were in the opposition – to review the electoral system that had 
harmed them could be blamed on ‘sour grapes’ and simply dismissed once these parties came 
back into power. Yet in each of the cases examined here, the parties that promised external 
reviews of the electoral system carried out at least that portion of their promises, and in some 
cases, more. These outcomes appear to contradict the common-sense assumption that 
politicians will only consider changing electoral rules when they believe that such a change 
will increase their share of seats beyond what they would otherwise expect, at the next 
parliamentary election.  
This rational choice assumption has been used by many political scientists over the 
years to explain why so many countries changed from majoritarian electoral systems to forms 
of PR.
3
 Recently, however, Richard Katz has argued that real-life political situations may not 
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be so simple, and he lists out several reasons why, in his words, ‘parties might change, or 
allow to be changed, the rules of a game they are winning’.
4
 These include the belief that the 
existing electoral system might not always be kind to them, perhaps because of changing 
political circumstances, as well as a simple misunderstanding of the consequences of electoral 
reform (or of the public mood regarding the issue if put to a referendum). The cases of New 
Zealand, Britain and British Columbia, described below, illustrate how particular 
circumstances pushed governments into appointing outsiders to review the electoral system, 
and how who these outsiders were had much to do with the outcome of their 
recommendations. 
 
INDEPENDENT EXPERTS: NEW ZEALAND 
Serious debate over the merits of New Zealand’s SMP electoral system arose largely as a 
result of the ‘wrong winner’ of the 1978 and 1981 general elections, in which the National 
Party won the majority of seats and formed governments, despite receiving less of the popular 
vote than the other big party, Labour. A change in the party system in the 1970s also affected 
the debate on electoral reform. As in Britain at the time, a shift away from two-party 
domination of the popular vote took place, with third-place Social Credit gaining 16 per cent 
of the vote and only one parliamentary seat in 1978, and two seats from 20.7 per cent of the 
vote in 1981.
5
  
 This question of fairness was the first criterion used by the Royal Commission on the 
Electoral System, established by the Labour government in 1985, to judge electoral systems; 
other questions were concerned with the native Maori people and other minority groups and 
how well they were represented and integrated into the political system.
6
 The Royal 
Commission held public hearings in New Zealand, and also travelled abroad to investigate the 
workings of alternate electoral systems. Its 1986 report, subtitled ‘Towards a Better 
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Democracy’, surprised many observers not only in that it recommended such a radical 
departure from SMP, but also in its advocacy of the (West) German form of PR, rather than 
the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ STV form of PR used in the Republic of Ireland and Malta, as well as the 
Australian Senate.
7
  
 The Royal Commission coined the term ‘mixed member proportional’ (MMP), rather 
than use the British term ‘additional member system’, used by the Hansard Society, to apply 
to a system in which half of the members of Parliament (MPs) would be elected in single-
member constituencies by the plurality method, with the remaining 60 members to be taken 
from party lists to make the overall partisan composition of Parliament proportional to each 
party’s national list vote. Each voter would have two votes on the ballot, one for a 
constituency MP, and one for a party, so that splitting the vote between two parties would be 
allowed. Therefore, the system is ‘mixed’ in the sense that MPs would be elected in two 
different ways, but proportional because list MPs would be added to compensate for 
deviations from party proportionality arising from SMP voting. The term MMP has since 
come to be the common label for this type of PR system among political scientists, replacing 
‘additional member system’ or ‘personalized PR’ (often used in Germany) in most of the 
recent scholarly electoral systems literature.
8
 
Despite widespread pessimism that a referendum on the issue would never be held, 
both Labour and National promised that voters would have their say on the question of 
electoral reform in the face of massive unpopularity of economic austerity programmes begun 
in 1984 by Labour and continued by National. These policies, sometimes implemented 
contrary to manifesto commitments, had a powerful effect on public attitudes towards 
politicians. One observer noted that the Labour government pursued ‘new right’ economic 
reforms with great zeal, ‘hell-bent on a course of action irrespective of the wishes of the 
people, and as such seemed to be treating the people with something approaching contempt’, 
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concluding that ‘without any effective political or institutional restraints’, there was ‘unease at 
all levels of society that perhaps the New Zealand people couldn’t trust their own 
governments’
9
. Therefore, support for a referendum on electoral reform grew, keeping alive 
the Royal Commission’s recommendations. 
Another factor in the public support for a referendum on electoral reform was the fact 
that the members of the Royal Commission were largely non-partisan experts, not politicians. 
This fact, couple with their appointment by one of the few senior Labour ministers critical of 
the SMP electoral system, Geoffrey Palmer, gave the Royal Commission’s recommendations 
a great deal of legitimacy.
10
 Those appointed were the chairman, John Wallace, a High Court 
justice; John Darwin, a former government statistician; Kenneth Keith, a constitutional law 
professor; Richard Mulgan, a political theorist; and Whetumarama Wereta, a research officer 
and the only female and Maori member. As Jack Nagel argues, ‘the possibility that at least 
some powerful leaders will be concerned more with constitutional principles than with 
individual or partisan advantage’, and ‘provisions in law or practice allowing for influence or 
decision by disinterested actors’ can help overcome the large parties’ hostility to changing the 
electoral rules that the conventional wisdom would expect.
11
 
However, the two largest parties threw up obstacles to further consideration of 
electoral reform wherever possible. While the Labour leader, David Lange, promised a 
referendum on electoral reform in a 1987 pre-election debate (possibly a mistaken reading of 
his notes, or an attempt to gain an advantage over National), he reneged on the promise once 
Labour was re-elected, leading National to make this a campaign issue in the 1990 election, 
which it won. Both parties this time had promised referendums, and National delivered, but 
attempted to sabotage the process by presenting the voters with five different electoral system 
options, rather than a straight choice between SMP and MMP. Despite this complication, over 
70 per cent of the voters chose MMP, and only about 15 per cent supported the SMP status 
 9 
quo in the 1992 ‘preferendum’. Furthermore, this was only the first stage of a two-stage 
referendum process; a year later, a binding choice was offered between SMP and MMP at the 
time of the next parliamentary election, and MMP won with almost 54 per cent of the vote. 
The new electoral system was implemented, more or less as the Royal Commission 
recommended, in time for the 1996 election, and has remained in place ever since. 
 
PARTY POLITICIANS: BRITAIN 
The British experience with a government-appointed electoral reform commission was very 
different to that of New Zealand. One major difference between the two commissions was the 
nature of the appointees. While Labour in New Zealand appointed largely non-partisan 
experts, New Labour in Britain appointed largely partisan ex-politicians. The Independent 
Commission on the Voting System, as the British government called its group of electoral 
system reviewers, was composed of chairman Roy (Lord) Jenkins, a Liberal Democrat peer 
and former Labour cabinet minister; Robert (Lord) Alexander, QC, a Conservative lawyer and 
banker; (Sir) John Chilcot, a civil servant; Joyce (Baroness) Gould, a Labour peer and 
campaigner on women’s issues (and the only female member); and David Lipsey, a journalist 
and former aide to Labour minister Tony Crosland.
12
 Lipsey was later made a Labour peer. 
 The highly political nature of the Jenkins Commission (as it was known) was 
criticized by many observers, including journalist Andrew Rawnsley, who wrote that the 
commission’s full title, the Independent Commission on the Voting System, was ‘a joke to be 
enjoyed by those who knew the truth’, since, according to Rawnsley, its chairman was 
secretly talking to the prime minister, Tony Blair.
13
 Academics could only contribute 
calculations of how election results under various electoral systems might look, or submit 
their views to a second volume published with the final report. Unlike their counterparts in 
New Zealand, whose report was subtitled ‘Towards a Better Democracy’, the members of the 
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Jenkins Commission worked under terms of reference that Iain McLean argued could be 
rephrased as ‘Find something which satisfies reformers just enough to count as barely 
acceptable to them, while comforting conservatives that it is the minimum you could offer’.
14
 
Unfortunately for the Jenkins Commission, its recommendation was unappealing to 
both advocates and opponents of reform. The proposal, called ‘alternative vote top-up’, called 
for the vast majority of MPs to remain elected in single-member constituencies (using the 
Australian form of preferential voting often called the alternative vote (AV), in which voters 
rank candidates in order of preference), while 15 to 20 per cent of MPs would be elected from 
party lists in a way that would attempt to compensate for the party disproportionality arising 
from the AV part of the system.
15
 The compensatory regions would consist of very small 
multimember clusters formed from groups of constituencies in the ratio of roughly eight 
constituencies to one list seat, with two list seats being the maximum. The commission 
wanted to overcome concerns that party list MPs might be seen as ‘second class’ due to their 
election from party lists in areas larger than traditional constituencies, although it could be 
argued that having so few list MPs simply exacerbates the perception problem, and using the 
label ‘top-up’ MPs does not help. The tiny number of list MPs, allocated in such small 
compensatory regions, also reduces the proportionality of AV top-up to such an extent that it 
should more accurately be called a ‘diluted majoritarian’ system – it would have been one of 
the least proportional electoral systems that scholars could (very technically, thanks to the 
compensatory element) label a form of PR. 
Most scholarly reaction to AV top-up was scathing. One political scientist, Matthew 
Shugart, argued that the proposal was ‘only a very timid step towards PR, yet is so complex 
that it may fail to provide for the outcomes desired by either the pro-PR or the anti-PR side of 
the debate’.
16
 The Electoral Reform Society, long-time advocate of STV, only reluctantly 
supported AV top-up as a temporary measure until STV is adopted, and among the wider 
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public a ‘Make Votes Count’ campaign never really got off the ground. Jack Nagel argued 
that the Jenkins Commission proposal, unlike its counterpart in New Zealand, MMP, ‘never 
inspired a popular movement, in part because of the perception that its ingenious plan was 
contrived to satisfy the partisan requirements of the government in power’.
17
 Furthermore, the 
recommendation of AV top-up, with its low level of proportionality, seemed at odds with the 
use of MMP for the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, and Greater London Assembly 
elections around this time. If genuine PR could be used for these bodies, then why not for 
Westminster? 
The Jenkins Commission’s proposal, combining elements of previous British electoral 
reform proposals (the Hansard Society’s 1976 recommendation of a proportional ‘additional 
member’ system, and the Labour Party’s Plant Report’s recommendation of the majoritarian, 
AV-like ‘supplementary member’ system) appeared to be a compromise designed to satisfy 
the government’s desire to retain a system that would yield single-party government most of 
the time, while placating the Liberal Democrats, whose leader, Paddy Ashdown, had become 
a potential ally for Tony Blair when both parties were in opposition to the Conservative 
government. On record as supporters of the proportional STV system, the Liberal Democrats 
nevertheless offered a cool welcome for AV top-up, perhaps because alternate electoral 
system scenarios showed that this system (or even undiluted AV) would offer them far more 
seats than SMP. The Conservatives, on the other hand, strongly opposed AV top-up, 
suspecting that it was designed at their expense, as implied by commission member Lord 
Alexander’s note of dissent regarding the use of AV rather than SMP for constituency voting. 
The party also claimed, however, that it supported SMP out of principle, despite the system’s 
disastrous impact on the Conservatives at the 1997 election.
18
 
Perhaps the most surprising result of the Jenkins Commission process was the level of 
hostility to AV top-up from much of the Labour Party itself. Academic modelling suggested 
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that Labour would do well by the system, and while some advocates of electoral reform 
within the party genuinely saw PR as a virtue, others (perhaps considering the long Tory 
domination of twentieth-century British politics) wanted to use a new electoral system to 
harm the Conservatives, even if that meant a ‘progressive’ pact with the Liberal Democrats. 
The potential for sharing power, however, did not appeal to others in the Labour Party, 
particularly those on the left of the party. Others were concerned about who would lose their 
seats when new constituency boundaries were drawn up that would, under the Jenkins plan, 
mean fewer single-member constituencies. This reduction meant that AV top-up was, in the 
words of Labour MP Martin Salter, ‘a recipe for civil war inside the Labour Party’.
19
 
Bringing about electoral system change while avoiding internal strife inside the 
Labour Party could be accomplished by introducing undiluted AV, which would not require 
the redrawing of, or reduction in, constituencies. AV, however, is not a form of PR, but a 
highly majoritarian system, in which losers are heavily penalized. Some observers, including 
Jenkins Commission member David Lipsey, saw signs in the years after Jenkins’s report that 
Labour might have been planning a referendum on its introduction.
20
 After Labour’s poor 
showing in the 2005 election, with the votes of just over 35 per cent of the electorate, coupled 
with anti-government voting, AV might appear too risky, as Labour could end up severely 
hurt by Conservative and Liberal Democrat voters who give each others’ parties their first and 
second preferences. PR might actually appear more attractive, as it had done to so many other 
parties facing declining support in early twentieth-century Europe, leading to the adoption of 
PR in most European countries. 
 
AVERAGE CITIZENS: BRITISH COLUMBIA 
The most obvious difference between the British Columbian electoral reform process and its 
counterparts in Britain and New Zealand was the nature of the outsiders appointed by the 
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provincial government to investigate the workings of the SMP electoral system. Instead of 
appointing ex-politicians or even independent experts, the British Columbia (BC) government 
failed to appoint a conventional commission at all. It randomly chose average citizens from 
across the province who were willing to participate in a long series of meetings over the 
course of 16 months, starting in 2003. The non-partisan body Elections BC, which conducts 
elections in the province, updated the electoral roll and randomly chose equal numbers of men 
and women, balanced by age cohort, from each of the 79 ridings (electoral districts), plus men 
and women of First Nations (aboriginal) background. From among those who were chosen, 
interested people attended informational meetings that described what the Citizens’ Assembly 
on Electoral Reform would entail after the selection process – a three-month ‘learning phase’, 
public hearings and deliberations – and ultimately one man and one woman were chosen from 
each riding and from the First Nations community, meaning that the Assembly had 160 
members, plus its chair, Dr Jack Blaney, former president of Simon Fraser University in a 
suburb of Vancouver.
21
 
 Such a radical departure from the conventional commissions seen elsewhere was the 
result of a wave of anti-establishment sentiment sweeping through the province, in part due to 
corruption scandals associated with the New Democratic Party government, which lost power 
(and all but two of its seats in the 79-seat legislature) in 2001. The opposition British 
Columbia Liberal Party leader Gordon Campbell had previously promised a ‘citizen review’ 
of the SMP electoral system that prevented his party, which had won the most votes, but a 
minority of seats, in 1996. Henry Milner stressed that the ‘citizen’ element of this assembly 
‘reflected the commitment to keep the process of electoral system reform out of the hands of 
politicians, with their inevitable vested interests: anyone directly involved in party politics 
was excluded’.
22
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 Using electoral reform for any sort of democratic enhancement, whether one agrees 
with the populist critique of party politics or not, represents a shift in the direction of the 
Canadian debate over the merits of PR. As Ken Carty points out, questions ‘of “democratic 
fundamentalism”, a vital element in the debate over electoral systems in most other places, 
have been pushed out of a central position in most Canadian discussions about the country’s 
basic electoral institutions’.
23
 What pushed out debate, until recently, on the democratic 
fundamentals of electoral systems in Canada was a 1968 article by Alan Cairns that 
questioned the long-held assumption that the Canadian ‘brokerage’ party system acted as an 
agent of national unity. Cairns claimed that the electoral system instead ‘exacerbates the very 
cleavages it is credited with healing’ by making ‘sectionalism’ (regionalism) a ‘fruitful basis 
on which to organize support. Divisions cutting through sections, particularly those based on 
the class system, have been much less salient because the possibility of payoffs in terms of 
representation has been minimal.’
24
  
 In other words, Cairns argued that parties devote their efforts to regions where they 
have strong support to ensure that they win the ‘bonus’ of seats manufactured by the SMP 
electoral system, and in the process, not only will class as an issue dimension be neglected, 
but some regions will not have adequate representation in the governing parliamentary party, 
with grave implications for national unity. Although Cairns wrote in 1968, the federal election 
result of 1993 forcefully illustrates the continuing relevance of his concerns. Two parties 
reflecting regional discontent with federalism, the separatist Bloc Québécois and the western-
based Reform Party, won enough seats to become the second- and third-largest parties in 
Parliament respectively, while the Progressive Conservatives, with support spread out across 
Canada, lost all but two seats. The victorious Liberal Party won almost all the seats in the 
province with the largest population, Ontario. 
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 In Canada, almost all PR proposals have advocated some version of MMP, in which 
party list seats are awarded to parties that do poorly in single-member constituency races so 
that not only is party proportionality achieved, but also so that the governing party will most 
likely have MPs from all over the country, enhancing national unity by allowing the inclusion 
of MPs from most provinces in the federal cabinet. William Irvine’s 1979 MMP model, for 
example, recommended a system in which single-member constituencies would become 
somewhat larger, and about half of MPs would continue to be elected by plurality from these 
ridings, with the other half elected from party lists in each province (and one list for the 
territories) in such a way that the total delegation from each would reflect the popular vote on 
a partisan basis.
25
 More recently, the Law Commission of Canada in 2004 also recommended 
MMP, similar to the model used for the Scottish Parliament, but it expanded upon the 
traditional argument that PR would enhance national unity. The Law Commission argued that 
a ‘Scottish-inspired mixed member proportional system would do a much better job of being 
fair and making every vote count than our current system’, citing fairness and better 
representation as justifications for the reform, in addition to the reduction of ‘regional 
imbalances in the legislative caucuses of all the major parties’.
26
  
The language of the Law Commission, invoking democratic improvement as an 
important reason for electoral reform, is also visible in proposals for PR in provincial 
legislatures. MMP has been the model proposed for the legislatures of Quebec, New 
Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Ontario. In Quebec, draft legislation to replace the 
Election Act aimed ‘to ensure effective representation of electors on the principle that all 
votes should count equally’.
27
 In New Brunswick, the Commission on Legislative Democracy 
recommended MMP, expecting, in addition to better representation and voter choice, that 
voter turnout ‘could also rise, along with general satisfaction with our democracy as voting 
becomes more meaningful’.
28
 In Prince Edward Island, a 2005 referendum did not support 
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MMP, despite the advice from the electoral reform commissioner that MMP would ‘provide 
effective representation for the electorate of Prince Edward Island and allow each elector to 
play a meaningful role in the electoral process’.
29
 In Ontario, a randomly selected Citizens’ 
Assembly recommended that MMP face SMP in an October 2007 referendum, arguing that 
MMP ‘preserves the strong local representation of the current system and adds new elements 
that will increase voter choice and produce fairer elections results’.
30
 
 While the above four provinces considered MMP, however, British Columbia came up 
with something different. The Citizens’ Assembly recommended BC-STV, the single 
transferable vote ‘customized for this province’.
31
 The Assembly rejected MMP by a wide 
margin, with 31 supporting MMP and 123 supporting BC-STV. The MMP model devised by 
the Assembly was actually quite similar to the ill-fated AV top-up proposed in Britain by the 
Jenkins Commission, but far more proportional, with 40 per cent of the seats allocated from 
open party lists to compensate for disproportionality arising from single-member constituency 
results, where the majoritarian AV would be used.
32
  
 Arguably, the great appeal of BC-STV was the perception of Assembly members that 
the system could reduce the role of parties and give voters more choice. The Assembly’s 
report claims that ‘the voter will have real power in determining who is elected’ because of 
the preferential nature of BC-STV, in which voters rank candidates according to their 
preference, and large parties would nominate more than one candidate per constituency.
33
 The 
report also notes that BC-STV ‘is also the only proportional system that allows independent 
candidates a real chance to be elected’, arguing that such candidates ‘must have opportunities 
to participate in our provincial elections equal to candidates who work through political 
parties’.
34
 Much of the report’s wording was hostile to parties, as this example illustrates: ‘In 
our current electoral systems, political parties, not voters, control the way MLAs [Members of 
the Legislative Assembly] represent their communities. BC-STV corrects this imbalance by 
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being voter-centred and candidate-focused: to be elected, candidates will need to put 
communities first.’
35
  
 As might be expected, BC-STV was not the choice of the provincial New Democratic 
(NDP) or Green parties, both of which preferred MMP, and did not appear to be welcomed by 
the ruling BC Liberals, who won almost all the legislature’s seats under SMP in 2001. This 
reaction is not surprising – political parties generally like the control they have over candidate 
nominations in single-member constituencies, or on close party lists, if PR is to be used – 
while the Liberal Democrats, Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru in Britain prefer STV. 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the anti-party sentiment associated with BC-STV, the 
referendum held in 2005 saw an overwhelming public endorsement of the proposal, with 57.7 
per cent of voters voting yes to the question ‘Should British Columbia change to the BC-STV 
electoral system as recommended by the Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform?’. The 
proposal had widespread support, with majority support in 77 of the 79 provincial electoral 
districts, but it failed to surpass the 60 per cent popular vote threshold required in the 
legislation unanimously passed by the previous legislature. Furthermore, some critics 
questioned whether voters really knew what they were voting for, and even whether they were 
actually endorsing the Assembly’s electoral system, or just the democratic nature of the 
process and perhaps the anti-party outcome of that process.  
 Some pollsters had misgivings about the wording of the question, which did not cite 
the alternative ‘first-past-the-post’ as an option (as was the case in the New Zealand 
referendum), and pointed out that less than a third of voters knew very much about BC-STV 
before the election.
36
 Nevertheless, it was apparently too difficult for the provincial premier, 
Gordon Campbell, to ignore the referendum’s result, and in September of 2005 he announced 
that another referendum would be held on the issue in November 2008, after the Electoral 
Boundaries Commission has come up with two sets of new boundaries for provincial 
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legislature elections, one for SMP and one for BC-STV. Campbell claimed that ‘it is most 
appropriate to allow all British Columbians a second, more informed, vote on STV’, knowing 
what their new constituencies would look like under both electoral systems.
37
 The second 
referendum would also require 60 per cent support for BC-STV in order for the PR system to 
replace SMP, but it would go into effect for the May 2009 legislative election (set for this date 
because of another democratic innovation of the Liberal government – it made British 
Columbia the first Canadian province to implement a fixed, four-year term for governments). 
The BC government found out the hard way that jumping on the populist bandwagon could be 
costly. The failure of the BC-STV referendum, despite the support of an overwhelming 
majority of the voters, put the Liberal government in a very awkward position. How could it 
justify rejecting the wishes of 57.7 per cent of BC voters when it only took 45.8 per cent of 
the voters to elect a Liberal majority government in the same election? The premier’s decision 
to hold another referendum, also with a 60 per cent threshold, was a gamble. It is likely that 
the BC premier calculated that the political fallout of ignoring the referendum result would 
have been worse than the risk of another referendum that might not achieve the required 60 
per cent.  
 Alternatively, another ‘majority that is not a majority’ – between 50 and 60 per cent – 
would cause another headache, as the result would maintain SMP against the wishes of the 
majority of the voters. While this could again present a problem, the government could 
always decide to enact BC-STV in such a situation if the Liberals are doing poorly in the polls 
and appear likely to lose to a resurgent NDP. Furthermore, allowing outsiders to consider 
electoral reform proposals that could be submitted to the voters in a binding referendum is 
fraught with dangers for governments, but could potentially rescue unpopular parties by 
distracting voters from bigger problems that are more costly and difficult to solve. As William 
Cross has argued, it is much more expensive to solve the problems associated with health care 
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and education, so Canadian ‘premiers may be looking, at least partially, at building their 
legacies around democratic and electoral reform’.
38
 
 
CONCLUSION 
As summarized in Table 1, this article examined three instances of external investigations into 
electoral system change across three decades. While different specific circumstances brought 
about these investigations, in each case there was a history of dissatisfaction with the SMP 
electoral system in use, with academic and often other criticisms, with the grievances of 
political parties instrumental in instigating a review of SMP. Once an external investigation of 
electoral system change was ordered by each of the three governments, the composition of the 
external bodies chosen varied considerably, however. In 1980s New Zealand the Royal 
Commission was composed mainly of independent experts. In 1990s Britain the Independent 
Commission was composed mainly of former politicians. In post-2000 British Columbia there 
was no conventional commission; instead, an assembly of randomly selected citizens was 
chosen. 
Table 1 
Summary of Electoral System Reviews 
Location/date Reviewers Proposal Referendum(s) Result 
New Zealand, 
1986 
Mainly experts MMP  1992; 1993 Electoral system 
changed 
Britain, 1998 Mainly ex-
politicians 
AV top-up Not held No change 
British 
Columbia, 2004 
Average citizens STV 2005 No change; 
second 
referendum 
promised 2009 
 
Each instance of electoral reform investigation was instigated by a perceived electoral 
injustice. In New Zealand the Labour Party had won more votes than the National Party in 
two successive elections, but lost both times because National won a majority of seats in each 
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instance. Coming to power in 1984, Labour was in the position to examine what had 
happened and to consider changes to the electoral system. The British Labour Party was out 
of power for 18 years and did some investigation into electoral reform of its own during these 
wilderness years. Its 1993 Plant Commission recommended SV, a majority preferential 
system very different from the MMP system recommended by the Hansard Society in 1976. 
Upon returning to power in 1997, New Labour’s leader, Tony Blair, launched the so-called 
Independent Commission on the Electoral System. The British Columbian Liberal Party, 
deprived of power in 1996 when the New Democrats’ seat majority in the provincial 
legislature came from a lower vote share, went ahead with an investigation of the electoral 
system after its huge landslide victory in 2001. 
In each of the cases above, the party that was once aggrieved by election results 
managed to return to power later. Upon the return of each party, the sense of injustice 
experienced earlier had dissipated. In New Zealand, Labour did not want wholesale electoral 
system change, nor did National, yet both parties were stuck with a referendum promise. In 
Britain, Labour moved strongly against electoral reform after its landslide victory of 1997, 
with Tony Blair only half-heartedly endorsing the Jenkins Commission’s recommendation. In 
British Columbia, the Liberals went ahead with the Citizens’ Assembly, despite a landslide 
victory in which the party won all but two seats in the legislature. 
Making promises about electoral reform can be dangerous, as these parties found out. 
Election results can eventually go in your favour. It is difficult, once you promise an external 
review of the electoral system, to get out of the promise when that system now works for you 
again. Therefore, in each case, some attempt was made to sabotage the investigation or the 
referendum process. In New Zealand, when governments could no longer ignore the radical 
recommendation of a truly independent, non-partisan commission, the referendum procedure 
was complicated by the dual referendum requirement. There would be a ‘preferendum’ 
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offering voters the choice of five different electoral systems, and then only a second 
referendum if SMP failed to come in first place (which did not go the way the government 
wanted).  
In Britain, however, a referendum was never held, with Blair ignoring his party’s 1997 
manifesto commitment without any substantial public outcry. The Jenkins Commission’s 
proposal, arguably designed to satisfy the government, was so unpopular with both the 
majority of the Labour Party and many of those wanting PR, rather than a diluted majoritarian 
system, that it simply died. The sabotage was possibly too successful, as the existence of 
genuine PR systems, MMP and STV, already in use for other levels of UK government, could 
mean that future moves towards electoral reform will consider these models instead of the 
deeply unpopular ‘AV top-up’. In British Columbia there was an altogether different 
approach to the consideration of electoral reform, one that invoked democratic legitimacy by 
using a highly representative assembly of non-partisan citizens who devised a ‘made in BC’ 
system of PR. Yet in creating this process, the BC government required that an unusually high 
threshold – 60 per cent – be applied to the referendum. This successfully repelled the result of 
the nearly 58 per cent ‘yes’ vote achieved in the referendum, but put the government in the 
difficult position of appearing to ignore the wishes of the vast majority of the voters. The 
government’s solution: another referendum, with the same high threshold. 
A critical comparison of the three cases reveals that the more independent of the 
government (and the wider political establishment) the reviewers, the more radical the 
electoral reform recommendation. In a climate of voter disenchantment with politicians in 
general, a more radical recommendation is more likely to pass in a referendum, something 
that the BC government might have anticipated in view of its supermajority requirement. 
Voter disenchantment with the political establishment in New Zealand appears to be a major 
reason for the successful passage of the MMP referendum. In Britain, voters were not allowed 
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the opportunity to vote on AV top-up, so we do not know. A more genuinely proportional 
alternative to SMP than AV top-up would probably have inspired those in favour of reform, 
but opposition among Labour and Conservative MPs would most likely have remained high. 
Furthermore, the recommendation of a less elitist, more non-partisan body of commissioners, 
rather than one crafted by the political establishment, would have been more difficult to reject 
in the way that the Jenkins Commission’s proposal was.  
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